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When the epidemic of Marburg hemorrhagic fever occurred in Uige, Angola, during 2005, the international
response included systems of case detection and isolation, community education, the burial of the dead, and
disinfection. However, despite large investments of staff and money by the organizations involved, only a
fraction of the reported number of cases were isolated, and many cases were detected only after death. This
article describes the response of Me ´decins Sans Frontie `res Spain within the provincial hospital in Uige, as
well as the lessons they learned during the epidemic. Diagnosis, management of patients, and infectioncontrol
activities in the hospital are discussed. To improve the acceptability of the response to the host community,
psychological and cultural factors need to be considered at all stages of planning and implementation in the
isolation ward. More interventional medical care may not only improve survival but also improveacceptability.
Lake Victoria marburgvirus (MARV), a member of the
ﬁlovirus family, can cause epidemics of hemorrhagic
fever in humans. Severe febrile illness, often accom-
panied by vomiting, diarrhea, shock, and disseminated
intravascular coagulation, follows an incubation period
of 3–21 days (mean, 7–8 days). Hemorrhagic signs (in-
cluding petechiae) were found to occur in 42% of hos-
pitalized patients in Uige, Angola (P.R., unpublished
data), and in 69% of all patients in Durba and Watsa,
Democratic Republic of the Congo [1].
The epidemic in Uige in 2005 was the largest Mar-
burg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) outbreakeverrecorded,
with 374 putative cases (158 laboratory conﬁrmed)and
329 deaths [2], although some cases may have been
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missed and others wrongly diagnosed. The epidemic
centered on the town of Uige, the capital of Uige prov-
ince, with an estimated population of 180,000 served
by a large provincial hospital.
The initial stages of the Uige epidemic were poorly
characterized, with no clear index case. The virus iso-
lates were genetically almost identical [3], suggesting a
single or few entry points into the human population.
Concerns about an unusual severe illness were raised
by doctors in the pediatric unit in Uige Provincial Hos-
pital for the ﬁrst time in October 2004, and low num-
bers of these cases were reported during the subsequent
months, with no recordedtransmissiontohospitalstaff.
These may not have been MHF cases. In early 2005,
the number of cases increased, and, on 9 March, the
ﬁrst death occurred among Uige Provincial Hospital
staff (ﬁgure 1). On 23 March, MHF was conﬁrmed by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
in Atlanta, Georgia. The hospital in Uige and some
smaller health centers were principal sources of MARV
infection early in the epidemic. During the epidemic,
18 staff members of Uige Provincial Hospital died of
MHF, along with many patients and contacts.MSF Intervention: Hospital • JID 2007:196 (Suppl 2) • S155
Figure 1. Time line of selected events during the Marburghemorrhagic
fever (MHF) epidemic, Uige, Angola, 2005. CDC, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention; iv, intravenous; MINSA, Angolan Ministry of
Health; MSF, Me ´decins Sans Frontie `res; WHO, WorldHealthOrganization.
On 27 March, an international response was started, which
was coordinated by the Angolan Ministry of Health (MINSA)
and the World Health Organization (WHO),whoalsomanaged
health education and epidemiological surveillance activities.
The Me ´decins Sans Frontie `res (MSF) intervention in Uige in-
cluded case management and isolation, as well as infection
control activities in Uige Provincial Hospital (described here).
MSF contributed to health education and epidemiological sur-
veillance activities and conducted safe burials (described in an-
other article in this supplement [4]). MHF diagnostics were
providedbytheNationalMicrobiologyLaboratoryofthePublic
Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) in Uige, as well as by the
CDC in Luanda, supported by the Institute of Virology of the
Philipps-University, Marburg, Germany.
The number of cases remained high throughout April and
then started to decrease. MSF Spain started the handover of
its operations and facilities in early June 2005, after no new
patients with conﬁrmed cases had been admitted to its facilities
for 2 weeks, and MSF terminated its intervention on 7 July.
The last patient with a conﬁrmed case died on 21 July 2005
[2], and the epidemic was declared to be over on 7 November
2005 [5].
The present article reﬂects on the lessons learned by MSF
Spain when responding to the MHF outbreak in the hospital.
DESIGN OF THE MARBURG WARD
Methods. When MSF teams started setting up the Marburg
ward, there were 5 patients with MHF in a makeshift isolation
room in the hospital, together with corpses that the hospital
staff had been too afraid to remove. The patients werereceiving
no care. This makeshift ward was incorporated into the ﬁnal
Marburg ward. When completed, the Marburg ward incor-
porated 4 separate structures at the edge of Uige Provincial
Hospital: 2 permanent buildings for patients with suspected or
probable cases and 1 permanent building for patients withcon-
ﬁrmed cases (ﬁgures 2 and 3), in addition to a large temporary
ward that was kept as a reserve. The size of the structures
allowed adequate spacing between patients with unconﬁrmed
cases, reducing the risk of cross-contamination. Fences around
the compound were made of thick plastic sheeting. Infection
control, barrier nursing, and disinfection procedures followed
MSF guidelines [6].
Results. The infection control procedures appeared to be
effective, and there is no evidence for transmission of MARV
within the Marburg ward. There was one entry and exit point
for staff and another for patients and relatives. The distance
between the 2 points, as well as the fact that the “clean” nurses’
area of the Marburg ward was at the back of the complex and
inaccessible, made communication between patients and staff
difﬁcult.
Lessons learned. In the future, it would be sensible to place
the nurses’ station where family members can easily commu-
nicate with them. Materials used for construction should be
optimized to reduce stress and provide a friendly environment.
Mesh fences that allow people to see through them may, to
some extent, demystify what happens in the isolation area,
reduce fear, and prevent rumors [7, 8]. However, more-solid,
opaque fencing may improve security and reassure those work-
ing in the area or living in the neighborhood that the biohazard
is contained. In the future, a combination of fencing material
may be used.
CASE DIAGNOSIS
Methods. MSF was in charge of clinical diagnosis of MHF
and management of patients with MHF within the isolation
ward. Laboratory conﬁrmation by reverse-transcription poly-
merase chain reaction (PCR) for a number ofpossiblespecimenS156 • JID 2007:196 (Suppl 2) • Jeffs et al.
Figure 2. Layout of the Marburg ward and isolation area near the end of the Marburg hemorrhagic fever epidemic, Uige, Angola, 2005. The layout
underwent a process of constant evolution, and this diagram reﬂects the layout toward the end of the epidemic. Arrows indicate the direction of
staff ﬂow. Exit A was used for the entry and exit of patients and their families, exit B was used for staff members, and exit C was used for the
movement of corpses. The rooms marked as wards are solid buildings; the outer perimeter fence is made of thick plastic sheeting.
types (principally blood and gingival swabs) was usually avail-
able from the PHAC laboratory in Uige Provincial Hospital
within 4–6 h. All results were conﬁrmed within 1–2 days by
the laboratory in Luanda, with 97% agreement overalland99%
agreement on MHF-positive results.
Patients were transferred to the “suspected” area of the Mar-
burg ward for testing. Any positive PCR result, whether from
blood or gingival swabs, was considered to be reliable, and the
patient was then admitted to the “conﬁrmed” section of the
Marburg ward. Negative PCR results from blood were consid-
ered to be reliable if the blood had been sampled after the ﬁrst
3 days of symptoms. Such patients were transferred from the
Marburg ward to the main hospital. Negative PCR results from
blood collected within the ﬁrst 3 days of symptoms were con-
sidered unreliable,becausetheremayhavebeentoolittleMARV
present to be detected by PCR. Such patients were retestedafter
a further 48 h, during which they were held in the suspected
area of the Marburg ward. However, many recovered fully dur-
ing this period and were discharged without further testing.
Negative PCR results from gingival swabs were considered to
be unreliable because of their unknown sensitivity. The use of
gingival swabs was conﬁned to sampling in the community and
for testing of corpses, whereas blood samples were used in the
Marburg ward.
Results. A total of 107 patients were assessed in the iso-
lation facilities, of whom 43 were conﬁrmed to have MHF.
CASE DETECTION
Case Detection in the Community
Case detection in the community was principally performed
by MINSA and the WHO. They organized a system by which
community leaders alerted a WHO team about suspectedcases,
as well as contact tracing, with teams following all contacts of
cases for 21 days and referring those who became ill. Patients
fulﬁlling the suspected or probable case deﬁnition (Appendix)
were admitted to the Marburg ward for testing.
Case Detection in the Hospital
Methods. Despite an informal system of screening for case
detection among hospital admissions during the ﬁrst week of
the MSF intervention, MHF cases continued to be detected in
the wards, and more hospital workers died. MSF suggested
closing the hospital until infection control could be imple-
mented. This was rejected because of the lack of alternatives
to satisfy the population’s hospital care needs. However, non-
essential services were suspended or reduced, and fears of con-
tamination decreased overall hospital attendance.
WHO experts introduced protocols to improve infection
control in the hospital, including screening for MHF at 3 sep-
arate locations—in the pediatrics, adult medicine, and mater-
nity wards. Safety rooms were established. These were normal
hospital wards in the main ward blocks where patients withMSF Intervention: Hospital • JID 2007:196 (Suppl 2) • S157
Figure 3. Left, Nurse being sprayed with chlorine while leaving the ward. This illustrates the protective clothing worn by nursing staff. Right, View
showing a section of the isolation ward. The conﬁrmed ward is on the left. The solid plastic sheeting used for the outer wall is shown in the distance.
fever with a low suspicion for MHF could be isolated outside
of the Marburg ward while being assessed. They were less well
set up than the Marburg ward. They did not, for example, have
separate latrines. Nevertheless, they continued to be used
throughout the epidemic.
On 27 April, MSF assumed responsibility for infection con-
trol in the entire hospital. MSF’s intervention in the hospital
consisted of screening all patients on admission,aswellasactive
case detection in the general wards, screening of corpses, and
improvements in general infection control.
MSF, by request from MINSA, continued to use 3 screening
points. Patients were screened using a special admission form,
and those fulﬁlling the suspected or probable case deﬁnition
(Appendix) were referred to an MSF physician for assessment.
Unless the physician made another diagnosis, these patients
were admitted to a safety room or the Marburgwardfortesting.
Because of the difﬁculties of wearing a full protective suit for
long periods, staff performing the screening wore only gloves,
gowns, and masks for normal assessments, and the only ex-
amination performed during screening was the taking of the
patient’s temperature. Stricter safety measures were used for
patients who were admitted to the Marburg ward or a safety
room. The presence or absence of fever at the time of assess-
ment was not found to be useful in deciding whom to isolate.
MSF regularly visited all wards to detect patients with MHF
who had been missed by the screening system. All patientswere
screened for fever by the ward nurses, and febrile or severely
ill patients were reviewed by MSF. To strengthen this ward
surveillance system and ensure that all patients had their tem-
perature measured twice per day, the WHO providedadditional
physicians and nurses.
Results. The initial case-detection systems failed to prevent
patients with MHF from being admitted to the wards. The
system set up by MSF appeared to be more effective. This may
have been because of increased levels of supervision by expe-
rienced MSF and WHO staff.
The assessment of pregnant women was difﬁcult. Because
bleeding is common in pregnancy, many febrile pregnant
women in the hospital fulﬁlled the suspected case deﬁnition.
It was often difﬁcult to rule out MHF without testing, but,
because many women required constant obstetric assistance, it
would have been difﬁcult to admit them all to the formal
Marburg ward for assessment. Therefore, a well-equipped iso-
lation area was set up in the maternity ward, including a de-
livery area and a ward area. Maternity staff were trained in
infection control, and separate teams were assigned to the iso-
lation area and the normal maternity ward. Any patient testing
positive for MHF was admitted to the Marburg ward.
Occasionally, there were patients whom the MSF doctors felt
clearly did not have MHF but for whom the hospital nursing
staff were too frightened to provide care, because of their fear
of MHF. Sometimes, hospital staff could not be persuaded to
provide essential lifesaving treatment without prior exclusion
of MHF by laboratory testing. The beneﬁts of treatment had
to be balanced against the risk of contamination with MARV,
and a few such patients were admitted to the Marburg ward
for essential treatment while laboratory results were pending.
None of them became infected during isolation.
Lessons learned. The best way to organize screening at ad-
mission remained unresolved. MSF favored a single entrypoint
to the hospital, where all patients could be assessed, because it
required fewer staff for supervision. MINSA favored the use of
3 triage points, arguing that this allowed patients to go directly
to the required service, as they were accustomed to doing.
MINSA feared that major changes in the patient ﬂow could
further deter people from seeking care in the hospital.S158 • JID 2007:196 (Suppl 2) • Jeffs et al.
The “safety rooms” were considered by MSF staff to be un-
helpful. Although patients were admitted only if suspected to
have MHF, infection control measures were less stringent in
the safety rooms than in the Marburg ward. MINSA’s hospital
nurses were poorly trained in the provision of care in these
rooms and generally refused to do so. Thus, MSF was forced
to provide care in them, despite an insufﬁcient number of
nurses to cover these rooms and the Marburg ward. Because
laboratory diagnostics did not reliably rule out MHF during
the ﬁrst 3 days of symptoms, some patients needed to stay in
these rooms for several days. The hypothetical advantage of
safety rooms was that they allowed isolation of patients who
refused admission to the Marburg ward. However, it was often
difﬁcult to persuade patients to enter the safety rooms, and it
might have been possible to convince them to accept the Mar-
burg ward if an alternative had not been offered. Furthermore,
having these rooms next to normal hospital wards appeared to
increase the fear in other patients.
MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF PATIENTS
WITH MHF
Methods. During the period in which the Marburg ward was
being constructed, MSF medical staff were instructed not to
enter the isolation area, because of safety concerns. When the
ward was considered to be fully operational on 5 April, diag-
nostic and treatment protocols were implemented.
It was impossible to test for and exclude conditions such as
malaria, because the hospital laboratory was unable to safely
handle samples with possible MARV contamination.Therefore,
all patients were offered oral artimisinin combination therapy
for malaria and antibiotic cover with cotrimoxazole. Other
treatments were given if indicated. All patients received oral
rehydration. Nausea and discomfort were fairly universal in
patients with MHF, so all received promethazine as an anti-
emetic and paracetamol.Strongeranalgesicslikemorphinewere
available. Cimetidine was given for dyspepsia. In the ﬁrst 2
months of MSF’s intervention, only oral treatments were pro-
vided, because medical staff felt that the risks to staff of pro-
viding injections or intravenous (iv) therapy outweighed pos-
sible beneﬁts for patients. Fluids administered iv were offered
from the third month, reﬂecting increased conﬁdence of those
working in the Marburg ward.
Several surviving patients had a prolonged recovery with
pronounced weakness. After the severe acute illness, with fre-
quent nausea and dysphagia, malnutrition was common. Na-
sogastric feeding was required for 1 severely malnourished
child. Discharge decisions were often difﬁcult with regard to
these generally afebrile but symptomatic patients. These deci-
sions were made by the MSF team on clinical grounds but were
backed up by 2 negative blood PCR results on consecutivedays,
which was considered to demonstrate a low risk of transmitting
MARV. Patients were discharged to the main hospital for easier
nursing, usually provided by MSF because hospital staff were
reluctant to attend to these patients.
Results. The failure to provide nursing care until the iso-
lation ward was completed had a negative impact. News about
the initial lack of care spread in the community, which is likely
to have reduced MSF’s standing and may have contributed to
the reluctance of patients to be isolated.
The documentation of clinical data on the Marburg ward
was generally poor, because this was not considered to be a
priority. Safety concerns about transferring records from inside
the Marburg ward to outside contributed to this. This makes
comments on the effectiveness of treatments difﬁcult. Care to
relieve symptoms in patients with MHF was considered to be
effective. The MSF team had the impression that the intro-
duction of iv ﬂuids provided a considerable beneﬁt for some
patients: 1 woman survived 5 days unconscious despite a very
hot climate, and a girl 5 years of age recovered from severe
shock; both had conﬁrmed MHF and received iv rehydration.
The policy of discharging symptomatic patients no longer
thought to have active MHF after a negative PCR test result
was obtained did not result in transmission of MARV in the
hospital wards, although it did place a considerable burden on
MSF medical staff caring for them.
Lessons learned. The failure of the MSF team to provide
care while the ward was being set up demonstrated a poor
understanding of the principles of biosafety, which is based
more on rigorously following appropriate protocols than on
the availability of physical structures. With adequate protective
clothing and safe undressing procedures, it should be possible
to provide basic medical care before an isolation ward is con-
structed. This failure had a very negative impact on the inter-
vention. In the tense atmosphere of a MHF outbreak, it is
essential to make a good impression from the beginning,before
rumors start to propagate.
Although no strong evidence is available on beneﬁts of iv
ﬂuids for patients with MHF, and although the risks to staff
cannot be denied, iv ﬂuids were considered to be very helpful.
Not only did they appear to improve survival, but they also
appeared to greatly improve the patients’ and their families’
perceptions of the Marburg ward, which enhanced MSF’s
standing in the community. Patients expect injections and iv
treatment in this area of Angola, and the number of individuals
presenting to the Marburg ward for assessment increased after
these treatment measures were introduced. Therapy adminis-
tered iv may be used to treat patients with MHF only if con-
ditions allow this to happen safely. In future outbreaks, care-
givers should strive to create these conditions, with good staff
training and supervision, safe venipuncture material, and
proper lighting. Furthermore, more effort should be made to
collect good-quality clinical data, to contribute to the evidenceMSF Intervention: Hospital • JID 2007:196 (Suppl 2) • S159
base for Marburg and Ebola case management. This has been
given a low priority in this and previous ﬁlovirus infection
outbreaks.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CARE OF PATIENTS
WITH MHF
Methods. The psychological care of patients and theirfamilies
intensiﬁed during the epidemic. After month 2 of the MSF
intervention, a tent was erected at the patients’ entrance to the
Marburg ward, staffed by an MSF psychologistandtrainedlocal
staff. The psychological team generally did not enter the Mar-
burg ward, because counseling in a full protective suit would
have been impractical. There was debate as to whether psy-
chological staff should enter the Marburg ward with the re-
duced protective clothing worn by relatives (see below), but
this was not allowed. Instead, counseling was offeredtopatients
across the fence in a shaded area of the Marburg ward. Patients
could also use this area to communicate with family members
too frightened to enter the ward. Counseling was also offered
to patients’ families. MSF’s psychological support network in
the community is reported in more detail in another article in
this supplement [4].
Results and lessons learned. It was difﬁcult to collect data
on the effectiveness of these interventions. However, the neg-
ative psychological impact of the epidemic was obvious, and
the psychological care system appeared to reduce this negative
impact and greatly improve relationships between MSF staff
and the community.
NURSING CARE OF PATIENTS WITH MHF
Methods. MSF was able to recruit extremely competent local
nursing staff to work in the Marburg ward, and all nursing care
in the ward was provided by MSF staff. Family members were
encouraged to provide supplementary foods appreciated by the
patients and to enter the Marburg ward to support their rel-
atives psychologically and to reduce their own anxiety about
what was happening inside. Familymembersweregivenamask,
one pair of gloves, a gown, and boots. They were advised to
avoid contact with the patients and were supervised while in
the ward. Parents of small children were allowed to stay with
their children.
Results and lessons learned. Reasonablenursingcarecould
be provided to patients, although the limited amount of time
that nursing staff could wear protective clothing in the tropical
heat made this difﬁcult. Allowing visitors to enter was consid-
ered to have improved the psychological care of patients and
to have helped MSF’s relationships with their families and the
community.
There was considerable debate about what degree of pro-
tective clothing should be provided to visitors to the isolation
unit. MSF provided visitors with a mask, gown, gloves, and
boots, and the nursing staff had an additional apron, hood,
goggles, and a second pair of gloves. This was done for a num-
ber of reasons. The full suit worn by nurses was difﬁcult to
put on and take off and was extremely uncomfortable. Because
visitors were asked not to have any physical contact with rel-
atives, they should not have been at risk. It was felt that giving
visitors the full suit might encourage them to take more risks,
which would be dangerous, because they had not been taught
to undress safely. However, some relatives questioned why our
staff had a full suit and they did not. This issue was not clearly
resolved.
Protecting the parents of isolated children was challenging.
Parents provideessentialpsychologicalsupporttotheirchildren
that cannot easily be provided by nursing staff. It would be
difﬁcult for parents not to touch their children, so the limited
protective clothing offered to other visitors may be considered
inadequate. However, it would also be impossible to wear full
protective clothing in the tropical heat for more than a few
hours at a time. Of the 4 parents with infected children whom
we admitted, 3 were already infected with MARV or recovering
from MHF, but 1 father who was not infected cared for his
baby with limited protective clothinganddid notdevelopMHF.
One baby was looked after by ward staff without a parent. No
clear answers as to how to care for small children were found,
and decisions were made on a case-by-case basis.
INFECTION CONTROL IN UIGE PROVINCIAL
HOSPITAL
Methods. The mainstay of the infection control system in
the hospital was the detection and isolation of cases, but MSF
also improved generic infection control. Before MSF became
involved, protective equipment was not universally available
and was often poorly used. Staff seemed to put moreemphasis
on protecting themselves than on preventing transmission
between patients. Soiled gloves were often worn all day and
used on multiple patients. MSF provided a store of protective
equipment for hospital wards and provided training on its
proper use.
The hospital water supply was inadequate, so tanks were
installed to improve water storage. Containers were supplied
to provide all wards with water. Because there was no safe
system for the disposal of sharps and contaminated waste,
sharps boxes were distributed, and temporarydisposalpitswere
dug. Training for the correct handling and disposal of waste,
supervision, and logistic support were provided. Protocols for
oral treatment of conditions like uncomplicated malaria were
also introduced in an attempt to reduce the number of un-
necessary injections.
Results and lessons learned. Attempts to discourage Uige
hospital staff from giving unnecessary injections were unsuc-
cessful and appeared to be counterproductive. It was felt thatS160 • JID 2007:196 (Suppl 2) • Jeffs et al.
more time would have been needed to allow retraining of the
staff to use alternative oral therapies and to change their habits,
especially because training was also required in many other
aspects of infection control. The local population had become
accustomed to injections, perceived to be more effective than
tablets, and put pressure on hospital staff to provide them. Not
only was MSF unable to prevent injections for conditions like
uncomplicated malaria, but trying to do so appeared to cause
resentment among the staff, who were happy with theirexisting
protocols.
CONCLUSIONS
An international response to terminate a ﬁlovirus infection
outbreak is based on the early detection and subsequent iso-
lation of patients. In Uige, only 44 of the patients with known
cases were isolated. In the absence of obviously effective ther-
apies, it is difﬁcult to persuade people to accept isolation for
the altruistic reason of preventing transmission within their
families and communities, particularly when traditionalhealers
often promise a cure. Proactive supportive treatment,including
iv ﬂuids and nasogastric feeding, may help to persuade people
to accept isolation, because patients often value the perceived
effort. Psychological support should be intensiﬁed and psy-
chological factors be taken into account whenplanningphysical
structures and response activities.
MSF Spain hopes to offer an enhanced approach to isolation
at the next occasion. We believe this may not only improve
outcomes and well-being for patients and their families butalso
may improve the communities’ perception of the isolation
ward. This may encourage the population to accept isolation.
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APPENDIX
CASE DEFINITIONS FOR MARBURG
HEMORRHAGIC FEVER, UIGE, ANGOLA,
7 MAY 2005
Suspected case
• Unexplained hemorrhage
• Fever plus 3 of the following symptoms: headache, an-
orexia, fatigue, myalgia, arthralgia,dyspnea,nausea,vom-
iting, diarrhea, dysphagia, and hiccup
Probable case
• Fever plus hemorrhage
• Death plus epidemiological link (see below)
• Two of the above symptoms plus epidemiological link
(see below)
Any of the above were sufﬁcient to deﬁne a probable case,
even if the results of a polymerase chain reaction (PCR) from
a gingival swab sample were negative.
Epidemiological link
• Contact with a probable or conﬁrmed case
• Contact with a sick or dead animal
• Treatment (transfusions, injections, scariﬁcation, etc.) at
health centers or from traditional healers
Conﬁrmed case
• Any positive laboratory test result: PCR (gingival swab
or blood), serological test, or virus isolation
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